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Improving Performance Through the Understanding of Organizational Culture: Binghamton University's Emergency Management Program

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Improving Performance Through the Understanding of Organizational Culture: Binghamton University's Emergency Management Program

BY

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Introduction

Emergency situations and unplanned events have the potential to throw an organization into chaos and seriously impact the ability of that organization to fulfill its mission. Critical incidents are unpredictable in nature and occur without advance warning or notice. The irregular frequency and critical nature of emergency incidents will often force an organization to immediately address the event at the expense of providing its essential services. Whether the agency is responsible for maintaining public safety, operating municipal parks, educating the community, or managing youth service facilities, the mission of the organization can be seriously impacted by the occurrence of an unplanned event.

An emergency incident may take many forms and impact an agency in many different ways. A fire or flood may destroy vital records, damage resources such as computers or office furniture, or may even consume a building making it unusable for the foreseeable future. A power outage or utility failure may prevent the completion of business operations such as financial transactions, legal proceedings, public hearings, or electronic communication. Acts of violence may impact the workforce resulting in the loss of trained staff members temporarily or permanently. Critical incidents such as these have the potential to cripple an organization in both the short and long term as resources are lost or reallocated to respond to and recover from the unplanned event.

As organizations focus their energy and resources on responding to unplanned critical events, the organization's attention is drawn away from its original mission. The organization's survival immediately and unexpectedly becomes the most pressing matter. Such was the case at Tulane University following Hurricane Katrina. Tulane was heavily damaged during the hurricane and subsequent flooding, and was forced to shut down for one year while it recovered

from the storm (Tulane, 2010). The university's mission, "...to create, communicate, and conserve knowledge in order to enrich the capacity of individuals, organizations and communities to think, to learn..." was completely suspended as a result of the emergency incident (Tulane University Mission, 2010). The university was unable to continue normal operations due to the impact of the emergency incident and the result was a complete cessation of all academic activities – the university's core mission.

Problem Definition

As demonstrated by Tulane University, institutions of higher education are not immune from the impacts of emergency incidents. Recognizing it is impossible to eliminate all emergencies, colleges and universities must determine how they can best minimize the likelihood of a critical event and the effects that incident may have on the institution. Campuses nationwide have begun to recognize the importance of incident planning and professional associations dedicated to elements of emergency planning are now plentiful. Organizations associated with law enforcement, environmental health and safety, and emergency management all exist and include elements specifically dedicated to practitioners at institutions of higher education. Table 1 provides a brief list of professional organizations dedicated to emergency response and preparedness on college and university campuses. These associations were created to address the unique environment present on college campuses and to assist practitioners with opportunities to improve skills and build capacity on their own campuses.

Table 1

College / University Emergency Preparedness and Response Professional Associations

<u>Professional Association</u>		<u>Professional Area of Interest</u>
International Association of Emergency Managers, University / College Caucus	IAEM UCC	Emergency Management
International Association of College Law Enforcement Administrators	IACLEA	Law Enforcement
Campus Safety Health and Environmental Management Association	CSHEMA	Environmental Health & Safety
SEHSA Environmental Health and Safety Association	SEHSA	Environmental Health & Safety

One of the institutions of higher education to recognize the benefits of preparing for emergency incidents is Binghamton University, one of four university research centers within the State University of New York (SUNY) system. Binghamton University supports professional police and environmental health and safety departments staffed by full time employees. The university is also served by a student run volunteer ambulance service and an employee based volunteer technical rescue team. In addition to these response agencies, an emergency management program operating from within the university police department is tasked with the coordination of all preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation¹ efforts of the university. The presence of these programs demonstrates recognition by Binghamton University

¹ *Preparedness*: The development of plans, policies, and procedures designed to lessen the impact of unplanned critical incidents. Includes all aspects of training related to preparedness activities.

Response: Trained personnel reacting to a critical incident with the intent of ending the immediate danger associated with the incident.

Recovery: The period of time following a critical incident that is required for the organization to return to normal operations.

Mitigation: The elimination or modification of behaviors, equipment, infrastructure, or procedures that present a risk from a potential hazard.

administrators that capability for emergency planning is an important aspect of operating an academic institution.

The emergency capability infrastructure built by Binghamton University focuses most of its resources on emergency response. University Police, Harpur's Ferry Ambulance, and the Emergency Response Team (ERT) are traditional response agencies whose primary responsibility is to react to incidents as they occur. Although these organizations contain elements designed to minimize or eliminate hazards before the incident actually occurs (such as community awareness training) the primary responsibility of these groups is to respond to an active critical incident while it is still unfolding. The university's Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) department has a slightly more complex role as it combines its emergency response activities with efforts in preparedness and mitigation. EH&S operates as a traditional first response agency to fire and chemical incidents as it employs knowledgeable persons in these specialized areas. In addition to its response capabilities, EH&S uses code enforcement and lab safety/inspection programs to reduce or minimize hazards before critical incidents occur. Although EH&S performs services in addition to emergency response, it is the emergency management program that takes the widest approach in regards to emergency planning. This program coordinates projects such as business continuity, pandemic, and comprehensive emergency management plans which include significant elements of emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. Table 2 illustrates the university programs with considerable responsibilities during emergency incidents, the areas of responsibility of these programs, and the number of staff assigned to the department/program.

Table 2

Binghamton University Emergency Preparedness and Response Department / Organizations

Department / Program	Area of Responsibility				# of Staff
	Preparedness	Response	Recovery	Mitigation	
NYS University Police	Limited	Yes	No	Limited	30
Environmental Health and Safety	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	9
Harpur's Ferry Student Volunteer Ambulance Service	No	Yes	No	No	150
Emergency Response Team	No	Yes	No	No	25
Emergency Management	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	1

Although Binghamton University has made significant efforts to reduce the negative impacts of critical incidents, there is still considerable work to be done. Projects that could potentially reduce the likelihood of an emergency (or reduce the severity of the event) have been repeatedly delayed or deferred. The public access defibrillation (PAD) project which places automatic external defibrillators (AEDs) across campus suffers from inattention which results in mandated monthly equipment inspections that are missed as well as the delayed replacement of expired equipment. In addition to the PAD project, the campus wide release of a continuity of operations plan (COOP) has experienced repeated delays over the course of three years and is only now being slowly released across campus. Furthermore, Binghamton University decentralized all first response agencies which resulted in poor communication due to personnel reporting through divergent hierarchies. Duplication of messages or the failure of important messages to reach senior managers frequently occurs and is a challenge which results from the organizational independence of each of the first response groups. In addition to the weaknesses within these projects the university has yet to complete a formal hazard assessment. Hazard assessments are the foundation of emergency planning laying the groundwork for all future

efforts. Without an accurate assessment, preparedness priorities are based on presumptions rather than confirmed needs. The current emergency planning infrastructure at Binghamton University faces serious challenges when attempting to adequately complete these important projects.

Binghamton University must determine how to increase the performance of the emergency management program through an understanding of the culture of the organization. By considering organizational culture the university can determine how to best utilize its resources as it strives to reduce the likelihood of an emergency event from occurring and to minimize the effects of the critical incidents that cannot be prevented. As state operated campuses are managed with limited financial resources, the ability of the university to expand programs or take on new projects may be limited. Yet the potential for losses from a major emergency could cost the university large sums of money or the institution may fail to meet its mission as it attempts to recover from a critical incident that could have been prevented or lessened in the first place. The impact of Hurricane Katrina upon Tulane University had significant financial and organizational repercussions that threatened the very survival of the institution. Although it may never be known the extent to which damage could have been prevented or if the campus could have recovered more quickly, increased investment into emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation programs would presumably have assisted the university in its efforts. To reduce the likelihood that Binghamton University could face consequences similar to Tulane, this research examines the organizational culture of emergency management programs and how Binghamton University can improve emergency management performance given its organizational culture.

Literature Review

Like individual personalities, organizational cultures create a unique identity that distinguishes one agency apart from another (Stinchcomb, 2007). These personalities are the combination of traits such as the values, norms, and the outward tangible signs and behaviors of the members of that organization (McNamara, 2000). Culture impacts an organization's overall performance and its ability to adapt to changes in its environment. The organization's culture will define how it will make important decisions that provide overall guidance and will impact its internal structures and processes (DaSilva, 2010). As the environment around an organization evolves, the culture of that organization will determine whether or not it will be able to successfully evolve and thrive. Legendary college football coach Woody Hayes was quoted as saying, "You never stay the same – you are either getting better or getting worse" (McManus, 2010). If Coach Hayes's presumption is correct, those organizations that embrace a culture of improvement through growth and change are in a far better strategic position than those who are failing to improve.

Those organizations that are strategically aligned to adapt to change often share similar characteristics. Miles and Snow (1978) define a model of organizational culture and how those cultures impact an organization's ability to adapt. This model states that most organizations can be defined as a defender, prospector, analyzer, or reactor. A defender organization is one which is successful as a result of its deep rooted history and the narrow focus of its mission. This type of organization focuses its energy on improving the efficiency of its existing programs. A prospector organization is based in an entrepreneurial spirit as it seeks innovative ways to address emerging opportunities. Its willingness to change and to experiment with innovation can cause a reduction in organizational efficiency. An analyzer organization studies similar

organizations and adopts changes that have proven to be successful within those other agencies. Reactor organizations are those which are slow to make adjustments and struggle to react to strong environmental forces. Reactor organizations often lack a well defined direction and are often unable to adjust to changes in environmental pressures. Research indicates that defenders, prospectors, and analyzers will often succeed whereas reactor organizations will not (DaSilva, 2010).

The Miles and Snow model provides a glimpse into how organizational culture can affect that organization's ability to grow and succeed. Organizations that embrace a willingness to learn and grow are those that will excel. Stinchcomb and Ordaz (2007) provide further insight into how organization culture can impact the future health of an organization when they describe culture as an invisible power that quietly combines with its environment. Whereas an influx of fresh oxygen has the ability to revive someone struggling to survive, a positive organizational culture can have a similarly enriching result for that organization. In contrast, the introduction of carbon monoxide is toxic by its very nature and will have a negative impact on an individual. This toxic impact is analogous to a negative organizational culture which will reduce motivation and have a harmful impact on the overall environment of the organization. Over time, positive and negative inputs will each have an impact on the overall culture of an organization. As the organizational environment takes shape, its culture becomes defined when there is a unification of behavior that forms a distinctive identity where employees are joined together into a collective loyalty (Stinchcomb, 2007).

A culture that results from a collective loyalty as described by Stinchcomb will have a significant impact on the future of that organization. As the organization is challenged with issues such as downsizing, restructuring, reducing costs, prioritizing projects, defining mission

goals, or any other strategic change, it is the culture of that organization that will affect the likelihood that intended change will succeed. Research shows that as many as 75% of efforts in relation to reengineering, strategic planning, and downsizing have failed to achieve the desired results and have created problems serious enough to threaten the very survival of the organization (Stinchcomb, 2007). If change and growth are to be achieved, organizations must foster a culture that identifies obstacles to reform and creates a culture that overcomes these obstacles.

Tierney (2007) provides insight into organizational culture and common roadblocks that prevent adequate and effective reform from occurring. Tierney's model defines the culmination of obstacles as the presence of cultural exhaustion and system freeze. The end result of Tierney's model presents itself when a series of organizational culture obstacles repeat themselves so that the individuals charged with implementing reform are discouraged from further significant efforts. In effect, the organizational culture is negatively impacted in a way that the culture continues in a downward spiral. Only through the maintenance and nurturing of an innovative culture can organizations hope to achieve significant and lasting reform (Tierney, 2007).

Tierney describes four common obstacles to innovation: lack of agreement, unclear time frames and structures, lack of evaluative criteria, and failure to articulate changes to the rest of the organization. Tierney describes 'lack of agreement' as the inability of individuals to agree on the problem that needs to be solved. Problem definition is the initial stage of reform and is critical to all future actions and decisions. Without a consensus on the problem that must be solved, the organization cannot efficiently or effectively reform itself. If individuals do not view the problem from the same perspective, their assumptions and actions will diverge. Furthermore,

lack of agreement on decision making responsibilities can prove to be a significant hurdle for many organizations. Without a clear understanding of individual roles and responsibilities, the confusion may undermine the ability for reform to succeed. An organization experiencing a lack of agreement on roles and responsibilities can be seen as an agency director who creates a committee to evaluate and recommend a course of action on a particular project. The director may view the committee's role as an advisor whose recommendations are merely suggestions and one of many sources of input. The committee members may view their role as that of critical players whose final recommendation will be implemented by the organization. The different perspectives on the role of the committee may lead to frustration and friction among those involved and be an impediment to success. To avoid the pitfalls associated with a lack of agreement, organizations must develop a culture that creates an atmosphere of agreement through open communication and clearly defined goals (Tierney, 2007).

In addition to lack of agreement, Tierney describes unclear time frames and structures as a roadblock to organizational reform. If an organization fails to provide clear expectations and deadlines, effective change can be difficult to achieve. Committees that experience significant personnel turnover will experience frustration as new members slow the process down so they are not rushed into making ill-informed decisions and recommendations. At the same time, veteran committee members will become frustrated that the process is slow and never ending as newer members become familiar with committee issues. Tierney recommends that organizations adopt a culture that clearly defines roles and timeframes to ensure necessary reforms are enacted (Tierney, 2007).

Tierney also warns the lack of evaluative criteria can be a significant impediment to organizational reform. Organizations must assume a culture that is willing to identify

benchmarks for determining the effectiveness of implemented change. Without adequate benchmarks, there can be no way to determine if the change was successful in achieving the desired reform. Furthermore, if an organization commits time and effort to ineffective change, individuals may lose faith in the process and become cynical about participating in future reform efforts. The cynicism of the staff members will result in the development of a negative organizational culture that will resist future reform efforts (Tierney, 2007).

According to Tierney, organizations also risk failure when attempting to achieve reform if the members of that organization fail to articulate changes to the rest of the organization. If decisions are made and policies are implemented without an organizational understanding of the reasons for those actions, the culture will result in the staff members resisting the change and preventing the reform from succeeding. Timely and accurate information shared throughout the organization will increase the likelihood of buy-in from employees and an increased opportunity for the reform to achieve its intended results (Tierney, 2007).

Organizations of every size and function struggle with the development of a culture that allows for appropriate growth and reform in the presence of environmental pressures. Organizations associated with public safety and emergency services face their own set of unique organizational challenges. Emergency service agencies are confronted with the challenge of enabling police, fire, emergency medical personnel, rescue groups, and emergency management to conduct operations in an integrated approach (Stinchcomb, 2007). In the wake of technological changes and the emergence of global terrorism, Homeland Security initiatives have placed significant pressure on emergency service agencies. These agencies must adapt to the external pressures or face significant liabilities and risks if they fail to implement reforms (Pinsky, 2009).

Homeland Security has adopted the traditional model of emergency management when defining its operations. Programs are categorized into one of four phases of emergency management: preparedness, response, recovery, or mitigation. Emergency service agencies have been traditionally aligned in the area of response as they are the first responders called into action at critical incidents. Pressure to expand into areas such as preparedness, recovery and mitigation are new demands being placed on old services. As Homeland Security has adopted the four phases of emergency management, the professional discipline of emergency management has expanded and taken on a larger role within traditional emergency response agencies. As the phases of emergency management become more visible and take on greater importance, the organizational culture of traditional emergency response agencies faces a significant test.

Police organizations are traditional response agencies tasked with the enforcement of laws and the protection of the members of the community. Organized police departments have been present in the United States since the formation of the New York City police department in 1845 (O'Connor, 2004). Police agencies have developed deeply entrenched cultures formed over the course of the one hundred sixty five year history of police operations in America. Garcia (2005) explains just how deeply set police departments are in their organizational culture. As explained by Garcia, police organizations often include multiple units that operate within the larger department. These units include patrol, special investigative units (i.e. homicide, vice, organized crime, gang violence, etc.), community policing, juvenile crimes, and domestic violence. According to Garcia, traditional police responsibilities can be divided into two categories: traditional crime-fighting, and social services. Traditional crime-fighting activities are the stereotypical masculine activities that involve the capture of 'bad guys' and the reduction

of street crimes through the use of uniformed officers patrolling city streets. Social services tend to be activities associated with domestic and juvenile violence, and community policing. These activities tend to be stereotyped as feminine programs requiring lesser physical strength that do not carry an equal value within police departments. The culture among police officers is one which holds the ideal patrolman as a crime-fighter, not a social worker. The law enforcement social service programs struggle to excel in an environment where those programs experience an internal culture that does not support their mission. With a stigmatization of police social service programs coming from the culture of the rank and file of the agency, there is a significant negative impact on the success of those programs (Garcia, 2005).

In addition to the organizational culture that resists internal change, police departments struggle to adapt to external change. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Presidential Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5) into law (Anderson, 2004). HSPD 5 established the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as the required incident management structure for all first response agencies in the United States. This system was developed by the fire service in the early 1970's as a result of wildfires on the west coast and had expanded to most fire departments at the time HSPD 5 was signed into law (Seidel, 2006). NIMS is a formal management structure which experiences implementation challenges based on the culture of the organization. The independent nature of police officers and the deep seated culture within this type of agency has provided significant roadblocks to the adoption of NIMS principles (Marietta, 2009).

As demonstrated by Garcia and the resistance to NIMS, the organizational culture within police organizations can be resistant to change and challenging to work with. Adoption of the four phases of emergency management within a police agency will require a significant

understanding of the organizational culture. If an emergency management program is to not only survive but to thrive within a police department, the culture of the organization must be considered. If that police agency is within another organization (such as a municipality, a private community, a college/university, etc.) then it will be necessary to consider the culture of the larger community as well as the police organization.

The cultures of organizations are like the personalities of individuals; they uniquely identify one from another. The dynamics of that culture will determine how receptive an organization is to change and how likely that organization will succeed when attempting to improve performance. Organizational culture will determine a willingness or resistance to change and an openness or opposition to innovation. To achieve desired performance improvements, organizational culture must be molded into an environment where change is embraced with curiosity and a genuine interest to better the organization. If organizational culture is not considered, or it is allowed to sink to a level that resists change and fights reform, then an organization will face significant obstacles when attempting to succeed and improve itself.

Methodology

This project performed a comparative case study of three similar organizations. The research design focused on how Binghamton University could improve its emergency management efforts through the consideration of organizational culture. Binghamton University, one of four research centers in the State University of New York (SUNY) system, formally developed an emergency management program in December 2005. As a young program, emergency management at Binghamton continues to evolve and build an identity of its own. The program is housed in the New York State University Police Department (NYSUPD) at

Binghamton University and employs a single staff member; the campus emergency manager. As projects involved with preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts are put into action, improved performance is desired.

To develop a better understanding of how Binghamton University can improve emergency preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts, research examined organizational culture through comparative case studies. An examination of institutions similar in size, organization, and administrative make-up was used to examine cultural influences on emergency management programs. Because Binghamton University operates from within the SUNY system, the largest state higher education system in the United States, research focused only on other SUNY campuses. This narrowing of research subjects allowed for consistency among the many SUNY system regulations, operating procedures, administrative protocols, and general complexity associated with this large organization. Within the SUNY system, case studies were further limited to those campuses with emergency management programs already in place. As existing programs face different challenges than those attempting to begin a formal existence within their institution, research focused on programs already established. Finally, data was solicited from emergency management programs that operate from within University Police departments. With unique cultural issues and challenges associated with police departments, data collection examined variables associated with these specific organizations. A total of three institutions, including Binghamton University, were identified as subjects of the comparative case study. Focusing data collection efforts on institutions and programs similar to Binghamton University provided critical insight to how the campus can improve its emergency management performance.

Once similar organizations were identified, data was collected through a series of telephone and/or in-person interviews. Interviews were conducted with campus emergency managers (i.e. individuals with program implementation responsibilities) as well as those individuals with supervisory authority for emergency managers. If an initial interview identified additional personnel as important or relevant sources of data, these individuals were included in data collection. One additional person was added to the interview list as a result of his role as a supervisor with close, but no direct supervision of the campus emergency management program. Due to expected retirements in the near future, this person is expected to have direct supervision of a campus emergency manager in the near future. A total of four individuals were conducted for this research, including the emergency manager's supervisor at Binghamton University. The interviews of individuals with direct or indirect responsibility for the campus emergency management program provided insight into the campus emergency management programs. This insight allowed for an analysis of police culture and its potential impact on the performance of the campus emergency management program.

The interviews utilized pre-determined questions which were open ended and designed to solicit detailed responses. Answers were documented via handwritten notes by the interviewer. Interviewees were encouraged to provide as much information as they choose and their responses were not limited in any fashion. Follow-up questions which were necessary to clarify input, ideas, or concepts were allowed. Such questions as, "what I hear you saying is..." and "Is my understanding of what you said correct?" were accepted as a clarifying questions to be asked during the interview. Impromptu questions intended to clarify the answer and draw out more detail from the respondent were encouraged. The use of identical questions with limited interaction from the interviewer provided for the greatest level of consistency among the

interviews. This type of approach allows for a high level of dependability in the comparison of the collected data. Furthermore, the use of open ended questions during the interviews permitted the respondents to provide data and insight in a manner that was not restricted by the data collection format. Respondents were not restricted in the manner or length of their response with the intention of drawing out information that may not have been otherwise collected by the interviewer.

To support the data gathered in the interview process and to provide additional insight into the selected cases, documents from the organizations were collected and/or reviewed. Formal organization charts were able to identify where emergency managers are located in the institution's hierarchy. These charts provided perspective on where emergency management programs fit into the campus culture. The review of program related documents provided an opportunity to not only understand the organizational makeup of the campus emergency management program, but it also provided an opportunity to observe the program in a limited fashion. The presence of completed emergency preparedness documents, contingency plans, community outreach information, and other program related documents provides a glimpse into the program's ability to accomplish its assigned responsibilities. The inclusion of a document review with personal interviews allowed a greater understanding of each research case than would be achieved by interviews or documents alone. The variation in data sources provided significant insight into the overall performance of the individual emergency management programs. This enhanced perspective provided the ability to combine what was learned about the organization's culture along with its perceived level of effectiveness and efficiency to develop conclusions that could potentially benefit Binghamton University.

Data Analysis

To develop conclusions for Binghamton University, data was examined and compared through a thematic analysis. This type of analysis was employed in an attempt to provide detail and insight that will illustrate the impact of organizational culture on the campus emergency management programs. A thematic analysis promotes an understanding of the similarities and differences among the case studies and potential explanations for those differences. The analysis looked for themes, or sets of patterns, that are noteworthy to organizational culture and applicable to the defined problem statement. Examination and comparison of the case study themes helped paint a picture of how organizational culture influences emergency management programs in higher education settings. The insight obtained through the thematic analysis provided a greater understanding of organizational culture and how it may be considered as Binghamton University attempts to improve its emergency management operations.

Findings


At the completion of the comparative analysis, several consistent themes were evident: 1) the leaders of each institution embrace a culture of progressive attitudes and a desire to ‘be the best’; 2) Each institution is working to create a cultural shift in attitude through the implementation of campus wide emergency management principles; 3) each institution faces cultural challenges from within the police department in which the emergency management program is housed; and 4) each emergency management program suffers from a lack of influence, authority, and resources when it comes to program implementation.

Finding 1: The leaders of each institution embrace a culture of progressive attitudes and a desire to ‘be the best’.

The fact that the institutions represented in this study have chosen to employ a full time emergency manager is a visible display of the progressive attitude of the institution’s leadership.

Of the twenty eight state operated campuses and thirty six community colleges under the management of the State University of New York, only four campuses employ a full time emergency manager. Four institutions out of sixty four, or 6.25% of all SUNY campuses, is a small minority of the public colleges and universities within New York State who have made the decision to staff an emergency management program (see Figure 1). These four institutions have demonstrated a willingness to commit time and resources to a discipline that other campuses have not yet embraced. The campuses that have chosen to create a formal emergency management program and hire a full time manager have demonstrated their willingness to be at the forefront of change. Rather than following the majority, the four campuses with a full time emergency manager chose a progressive approach that distinguishes them from their peers.

Figure 1: SUNY Campuses Employing a Full Time Emergency Manager



The progressive attitude shared by the studied institutions was illustrated by the comments of the study's participants. One emergency manager stated that he shares a common

belief with not only his boss, but with his institution's executive leadership, that they should "never settle for minimum requirements." The emergency manager described a culture on the campus where minimum standards are not considered an acceptable level of performance and the institution's desire to excel can only be accomplished when minimum standards are not accepted as the norm. A second interviewee supported the concept of achieving a high level of performance when he stated, "Our goal is to be the emergency management leader within the entire SUNY system. We want to be the best of the best." These comments demonstrate organizational cultures that do not accept the status quo and challenge the institutions to constantly work to improve their operations. According to the Miles and Snow model, these organizations fall into the category of 'prospector' organizations due to their entrepreneurial focus and willingness to explore new operational methods. As previously discussed, a 'prospector' organization is well positioned to adapt to change and to succeed through its progressive outlook.

The progressive cultures held by the members of the three institutions are further demonstrated by each institution's willingness to empower the emergency manager during critical incidents. In each of the case studies, the institution has taken the extraordinary step of giving the emergency manager substantial responsibility and authority during an emergency event. In all cases, each campus has developed policies that give the emergency manager the ability to make decisions for the institution that would otherwise be reserved for executive officers of the college / university. One interviewee describes the utilization of an Incident Management Team (I.M.T.) that assumes all operational control of the university during serious emergency incidents. The I.M.T. is comprised of high level administrators (i.e. directors, deans, associate/assistant vice presidents, etc.) which coordinates all actions and decisions of the

university during critical incidents and has the authority to spend large sums of money. The I.M.T. is managed and directed by the campus emergency manager. Although the emergency manager is significantly lower in the institution's hierarchy than other team members during normal day-to-day operations, when the I.M.T. has been activated the emergency manager directly supervises each of these individuals. An interviewee described the role of the emergency manager as, "the conductor of the orchestra." This metaphor aptly describes the responsibility given to the emergency manager during unusual circumstances. The willingness by executive leadership to provide extraordinary authority to the campus emergency manager demonstrates their ability to consider new approaches and to accept positive change.

In addition to providing extraordinary authority to the emergency manager during critical incidents, the institutions included in this study have further demonstrated their desire to lead and excel through the addition of creative programs and solutions. One institution has created an 'Emergency Response Team' (ERT) comprised of volunteers from the campus' full time staff members. This team was created when the institution saw a gap in services provided by local first responders and recognized the university had the expertise and resources to create and manage its own team. The team, which specializes in highly technical rescue situations, is unique within the SUNY system, and possibly all other colleges and universities nationwide. The institution's willingness to proactively fill a needed gap illustrates the progressive attitude and culture necessary to succeed and excel.

As a further demonstration of a proactive culture, one of the studied institutions demonstrates its forward thinking through its creative approach to funding sources available for the program. This institution's emergency management program, like all other state operated programs, is currently suffering from a lack of adequate funding. To combat this problem the

campus emergency manager has worked with university leadership to pursue non-traditional funding sources. As a result, the emergency management program has been able to establish a fund through the institution's Research Foundation² to solicit donations from outside sources. This type of forward thinking once again represents the institution's progressive attitude and willingness to try new methods for improving services.

Each of the institutions studied as part of this project demonstrated a high level of progressive thinking and openness to change. They are all motivated to achieve success at the highest level and have created an environment that is willing to accept new ideas and attempt bold endeavors. The progressive attitudes emanate from the institution's executive leadership and are carried down to the emergency management program. Each campus has taken this progressive style of thinking and has created an organizational culture that has welcomed emergency management into its institution.

Finding 2: Each institution is working to create a cultural shift in attitude through the implementation of campus wide emergency management principles.

Although the executive leadership has created a progressive environment for an emergency management program to exist, programs need more than the support of senior management in order to excel at their assigned tasks. The four elements of emergency management (i.e. mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery) require the participation of all campus departments, units, and offices. An emergency manager cannot develop a comprehensive emergency plan without the involvement of many campus constituents. However, past practices from each of the studied institutions indicates that individual department, unit, and office involvement in emergency planning and preparedness was minimal

² A non-profit organization within the State University of New York created to raise funds to support the mission of the college / university.

or non-existent prior to the creation of the emergency management program. One interviewee stated, “Preparedness must be institutional, not just the responsibility of emergency personnel. Emergency management needs to be integrated into the university – organization wide.” A second interviewee stated, “Emergency management responsibilities go beyond typical first response organizations. Everyone must recognize the value of emergency management and begin to embrace this new reality.” A research respondent adamantly stated, “Emergency management is not a program, it is a way of doing business. We need to create a culture that embraces emergency management concepts wholeheartedly and not view it as a ‘program’ with some tasks that must be accomplished before we can get back to our ‘regular’ business.” These statements reflect the need for the involvement and a cultural acceptance of all levels of the institution, not just executive leadership.

Each of the studied institutions described challenges associated with participation from campus staff and faculty. One interviewee acknowledged the obstacle that, “people don’t understand what emergency management is.” Another interviewee stated that campus employees are often “mystified” by emergency management and its responsibilities. Each interviewee acknowledged that recognition of the emergency management program is important for its success. One respondent observed that, “it would be difficult for staff and faculty to embrace emergency management concepts when they don’t know what those concepts are.” Respondents also acknowledged that although program recognition is improving there is considerable work to be done in order to achieve a campus wide understanding of emergency management.

Interviewees did not just describe a lack of awareness of emergency management as a challenge associated with program success. There was consensus among all of the interviewees

that employees do not often see emergency management as a priority in their professional lives. One interviewee described a common problem of having no luck motivating department heads to work with him to develop basic emergency plans for individual departments. The emergency manager described the situation as, “a never ending battle to convince people that they should take some responsibility for their own safety.” Another interviewee explained a common misconception when he stated, “many employees don’t believe an emergency will happen to them. They believe it will only happen to the other guy.” The interviewee believed this type of thinking leads to complacency and reluctance to participate in emergency preparedness activities. The existing culture does not motivate the campus community to make emergency management efforts a priority, and changing this culture is a battle the campus emergency managers continue to fight.

Although there is considerable complacency and a lack of motivation within many of the studied campuses, there were outward signs that the campus culture has begun to shift. In each of the studied institutions, emergency management programs have become integrated into some campus wide initiatives. Traditional security and safety efforts such as closed circuit television (CCTV), access control, fire safety, blue phones³, and public access defibrillation have easily integrated into an emergency management program due to their purpose/role in an emergency situation. Other programs such as business continuity, mental health counseling, and services for the disabled have begun to embrace an emergency management perspective in their programs. Business continuity has traditionally been perceived as an Information Technology (IT) program that supports the continuation of computer services. In each of the studied institutions, the campus emergency manager has become the lead person in the development and management of

³ Blue phones are outdoor emergency telephones located across college campuses in the United States. These phones typically have a dedicated connection to a public safety agency, such as University Police. The phones are identified by a blue light mounted on a pole or building above the phone.

a campus wide Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP). This plan goes beyond IT responsibilities and looks at the college/university as a whole to develop institutional resiliency. COOP plans integrate emergency management principles into every element of the college/university's operations. Involvement from campus groups such as IT, human resources, residential life, academic affairs, financial / business offices, etc. are all critical to the continuity of services of a college/university and have begun to embrace emergency management principles as they plan for the institution's survival following an emergency situation.

In addition to business continuity planning, emergency management has become ingrained in other elements across campus. Mental health counseling has begun to involve campus emergency managers as the counselors seek new ways to identify people of concern and for opportunities to improve personal health and safety. Several interviewees described the creation of campus committees designed to open lines of communication between public safety, student affairs, human resources, academic affairs, and residential life. These committees utilize the four principles of emergency management (i.e. mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery) as they set out to accomplish their assigned task. Campus departments associated with services for the disabled have also begun to reach out to campus emergency managers to develop comprehensive plans and training for their constituents. One emergency manager explained how he is able to work with his Director of Student's with Disabilities office to examine needs related to evacuation and notification of the disabled. The involvement of emergency management in these campus programs illustrates a willingness to utilize the resources available through the campus emergency manager and the beginning of a shift towards understanding and acceptance of what this type of program is capable of accomplishing.

The research indicates that campus based emergency management programs have begun to integrate emergency management principles into campus wide projects and programs.

Although this process has begun to take shape, work is continuing to combine the elements of emergency management into all campus departments, units, and offices. The institutions receive support from management, but respondents indicated that success must include active participation from all campus departments, units, and offices.

Finding 3: Each institution faces cultural challenges from the police department which houses the emergency management program.

The research indicates that although the studied institutions face an evolving organizational culture (when considering the institution as a whole), one of the biggest challenges faced by the emergency management programs is the culture of the law enforcement program it is housed within. Every participant in this study acknowledged challenges associated with an emergency management program operating from within a University Police Department (UPD). One interviewee stated, “Law enforcement does not like change and will actively resist all change, even if the change is perceived as positive.” This respondent stated that this resistance to change is due to several factors which include a lack of understanding, lack of a work ethic (i.e. laziness), perception of an increase in individual workload, and a general desire to maintain the comfort level of the status quo. There was a consensus among all of the research participants that the police culture was resistant to changes emerging from emergency management initiatives.

Research respondents identified the desire for power as an obstacle within the police department. Two respondents used the word ‘fiefdoms’ when describing the culture of the police department. One interviewee observed that campus “power and influence” comes from

budgets and the individuals who control the money control “everything”. This interviewee acknowledged that the campus emergency manager has no budget and must approach the Chief of Police for every financial request, no matter how small or how large. The interviewee stated, “The Chief of Police would have to be willing to give up control of some money and perceived power for the emergency manager to achieve the type of authority that should be granted to him. This is very unlikely due to the Chief being unwilling to reduce the size of his ‘kingdom’.” Another interviewee provided similar statements when he described an environment where the “controlling nature and type-A personalities involved with my [police] department made it difficult for the emergency management program to get any credit for what it does.” Although several respondents acknowledged that the presence of power struggles is not necessarily unique to police culture, they were of the opinion that the personalities drawn into law enforcement amplified the need for power and the presence of ‘fiefdoms’.

At least one representative from each institute participating in this research acknowledged the challenge for emergency management to receive credit for the work it accomplished. One respondent stated he must give up credit and allow it to be given to others if he wanted the project to progress. The respondent stated, “It doesn’t matter who gets the credit, as long as the job gets done.” This level of selflessness was evident at a separate institution when an interviewee echoed the need to give up credit in order to achieve progress. He stated, “I don’t need credit for everything I do, I’m not a big ‘credit’ guy.” Yet another respondent stated, “[Police] supervisors don’t share credit. Emergency management is relatively new on campus and does not get the political credit it is due. The existing power structure allows ‘higher-ups’ to take credit for emergency management projects without passing the credit down.” Several interviewees were concerned that the need to give up credit for short term successes could hurt

the long term goals by lowering the level of understanding and acceptance of the emergency management program. Although this was a real concern for them, they felt that allowing others to take credit for emergency management efforts was necessary in order to achieve some level of success within the police department.

In addition to the obstacles associated with achieving political credit, there is a clear challenge to the emergency manager's authority on each studied campus. One interviewee observed that, "police don't like to share authority." Another respondent confirmed this belief when he described the reluctance of police officers (non-management) to take direction from an emergency manager during planned events (i.e. commencement, concerts, etc.). This respondent pointed out the existence of written procedures that placed the emergency manager in charge of all operations at these events and put that individual in a position to supervise law enforcement. Although the procedures were in place to give the emergency manager the necessary authority, patrol officers would intentionally work around the emergency manager and continue with their traditional structure and culture. The actions of the police officers to circumvent a hierarchy that involved emergency management makes it difficult for the emergency management programs to develop and grow to their full potential.

One research respondent provided an exception to the resistance the others experienced while working from within University Police. This interviewee is the emergency manager for his institution but also holds certification as a sworn police officer. This respondent stated, "My status as a sworn officer aids tremendously in how my messages, programs, and projects are received. Because I am seen as an equal, patrol doesn't often question me. I am seen as one of them. I believe this would be very different if I wasn't a sworn police officer." Because he is a police officer with emergency management duties, he does not have to fight the organizational

culture of the police department. If he were a ‘civilian’ emergency manager, he envisions his message may be lost even before it is delivered to the patrol officers. The closed culture of a police department already provides obstacles to change; this interviewee did not wish to also fight the battle from a ‘civilian’ position.

Within each of the University Police Departments there was a communication barrier that presented itself due to the law enforcement culture. As police operations are twenty four hour per day operations, management does not always have the luxury to meet face to face with each employee to discuss department policies and procedures. The lack of opportunity for face-to-face communications has resulted on an almost exclusive reliance on written communication. Methods that included memos, posting policies on bulletin boards, and requiring employees to sign a form acknowledging receipt of a written communication were the commonly used methods at each studied institution. Of the campuses included in this study, not a single department used verbal communication from management down to patrol officer to ensure the delivery of a consistent message. One respondent stated that, “Verbal communication is sometimes used, but it is seldom and it is discouraged because of miscommunication. Previous incidents when employees deny they were told of the change, or claim to have been told something different than other employees have resulted in an almost exclusive reliance on written communication.” Several respondents acknowledged the exclusive use of written communications limits much of the detail that is provided to officers. “Without being able to see body language, hear nuances in voice inflection, and ask questions in an open forum, employees don’t always fully understand the message or appreciate why management is making the decisions it is making” states one of the respondents. According to the previously discussed model by Tierney, failure to articulate changes to the rest of the organization may have a

detrimental impact on the organization's ability to implement effective organizational reform. Furthermore, Tierney's model warns of situations that may lead to confusion and unclear roles and responsibilities. As described by Tierney, this type of ambiguity is a contributing factor to a failure of organizational culture to adapt to change. One interviewee observed that the current method of internal communication is a difficult way to introduce new and complex concepts like emergency management and possibly results in some of the internal resistance experienced by the emergency manager.

In addition to the communication challenges present in a police department, programs operating from within a law enforcement agency are often stigmatized by the officers themselves. As earlier described by Garcia, police departments have been traditionally divided into patrol functions and social services. Because emergency management cannot be considered a typical patrol function, many officers appear to perceive its duties as being aligned with the social service responsibilities of the department. The perception as a social service type of program, according to Garcia, lends itself to resistance to acceptance and potential challenges for internal resources. Garcia's theoretical model is further displayed with the presence of social service programs in the University Police Departments. These programs include Rape Aggression Defense (RAD), community policing, and crime prevention education within their police department. In nearly every instance, respondents indicated the social service programs were led by female officers as predicted by Garcia. Although all of the SUNY campus managers are males, the lack of police authority and a general lack of understanding of emergency management allows officers to treat emergency management like a social service program and thus not give it the open support and resources it may need to succeed. Several respondents pointed to the law enforcement culture as a significant obstacle to the overall success of the

emergency management program. From dealing with ‘fiefdoms’, to receiving credit for program successes, to internal communication barriers, a police department places significant obstacles in the way of any non-law enforcement program trying to survive.

Finding 4: Each emergency management program suffers from a lack of influence, authority, and resources when it comes to program implementation.

At the completion of the research, it became clear that representatives of each institution were aware of and concerned about the lack of influence, authority, and resources available to the emergency management programs. Although the institution’s executive leaders have provided the emergency manager with an extraordinary level of authority during the management of critical incidents, this level of authority is not present during normal day-to-day operations. When completing individual projects such as the writing of pandemic plans, soliciting department participation in continuity planning, or simply involving staff and faculty in training programs, the emergency manager lacks an appropriate level of authority to mandate participation in these tasks. One interviewee observed, “If the emergency manager was higher in the organization’s hierarchy, he would have more opportunity to influence deadlines as well as department compliance.” In each of the case studies, the emergency manager lacked the authority to require anyone’s participation or to enforce deadlines in emergency management projects. Several of the interviewees stated they believed there were many people in the institution that would not participate in emergency preparedness efforts because the emergency manager lacked the authority to make it a priority. Although the emergency manager could not mandate participation, the institution’s leaders expected the emergency manager to complete projects with campus wide involvement. For example, one respondent identified the challenges he currently is facing when he attempts to receive input from individual campus departments

while developing the campus continuity of operation plan. Although the creation of the plan is required for each institution, only a small number of offices are actively participating. The respondent lacks the authority to directly influence individual department participation and thus the quality of the written plan suffers.

In addition to challenges associated with participation in individual emergency management projects, interviewees described the process the emergency manager must take to receive approvals for new policies or projects as an example of the lack of authority given to the emergency manager. In order to initiate a new policy or begin a campus wide initiative, the emergency manager is required to pass requests up through the chain-of-command with the hope that someone with authority would support the project and require the participation of anyone necessary to achieve project success. At any point in this process, a manager may alter or eliminate a policy or project from further consideration. A respondent stated, “The emergency manager is required to go through many levels of approval before policies can be made or a project can grow institution wide. There are too many bosses who can change the project before it is even seen by senior administration.” This respondent observed that the administrators who often filter the information coming from the emergency management program have little or no emergency management experience. Each of the emergency managers had a different level of access to the campus President (see Table 3) and the more layers of management that were present reflected a higher level of difficulty in receiving the necessary approvals. One respondent observed that, “having the emergency manager only two people away from the President demonstrates the commitment the university has for emergency management.” He believes that placing the emergency manager high in the organization sends a signal to the rest of the institution that emergency management is a priority for the university.

Table 3

Levels of Management between the Campus President and the Emergency Manager

Case #1	Case #2	Case #3
President	President	President
Vice President / Chief of Police	Vice President	Vice President
Emergency Manager	Chief of Police	Chief of Police
~	Emergency Manager	Assistant Chief of Police
~	~	Emergency Manager

In addition to a lack of authority, several of the respondents commented on a lack of resources available to the emergency management program as a significant hurdle they struggle to overcome. Two of the research cases employed a single person in the emergency management program and one case employed an emergency manager and an administrative assistant. One interviewee stated, “The emergency management program needs more staff to accomplish the assigned goals. A one-man show is not easy.” Several respondents observed that many of the emergency management projects are now regulated and completion is mandatory. These requirements continue to place additional burdens on an already overtaxed program. In addition to the lack of adequate staffing, many of the respondents commented on severe budget constraints. One respondent stated that, “Budget is a constant battle. There is a huge need for more financial resources to be able to accomplish desired goals.” Another respondent stated, “Emergency Management should be a separate department where the emergency manager has the authority to control his budget, determine his own priorities, and report directly to the vice presidential level.” This interviewee commented that the lack of authority, no control over finances, and the lack of access to executive leadership were all significant obstacles to the overall success of the emergency management program. Across all studied institutions, the lack

of influence, authority, and resources created a serious concern that was shared by nearly all of the research participants.

Recommendations

The research question that motivated this study examines the organizational culture of the emergency management program at Binghamton University to determine if it can improve emergency management performance given its organizational culture. At its core, this question acknowledges that organizational culture is inherently difficult to change and is not something that occurs quickly. Rather than reforming culture, the study focuses on having the emergency management program work within the organization in a fashion that is complimentary to and compatible with the existing culture. As cultural reform is not a realistic goal for this project, the recommendations that follow are presented as a means to symbolize a shift in culture; a beginning of institutional wide behavioral change. The structural and functional nature of the recommendations are realistic and actionable items that the organization may immediately consider. They are intended to work within the existing organizational culture to be the seeds that allow new behaviors to grow and succeed.

The recommendations gained from the insight of the comparative case study presents recommendations to Binghamton University that have potential benefits to both the efficiency and effectiveness of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. Throughout the research, four recommendations have become clear: Binghamton University should, 1) utilize the progressive attitude of executive leadership to grow a progressive organizational culture institution wide; 2) create a separate emergency management department or elevate the emergency manager in the campus hierarchy; 3) expand communications within the University Police Department; and 4) certify the emergency manager as a sworn police officer. As these

recommendations are not dependent upon one another, Binghamton University may consider any combination of these recommendations to improve the emergency management program's performance.

Recommendation 1: Utilize the progressive attitude of the executive leadership to grow a progressive organizational culture institution wide.

As was demonstrated in each case study, the institutions with full time emergency managers enjoy progressive attitudes from the campus leadership. Although there have been early signs of a cultural shift that integrates emergency management into long standing university programs, there was wide agreement that most staff and faculty have not yet embraced a culture that welcomes emergency preparedness. Binghamton University should build upon the support it receives from senior staff by using the senior staff to launch new programs and to announce emergency management initiatives. The emergency manager should stand side-by-side senior staff during major announcements and forums which stress the importance of emergency preparedness. By using the executive leadership in a highly visible manner, there will be an outward sign to the rest of the institution that emergency management programs are a priority to the President and Vice Presidents, and therefore a priority to all staff and faculty. This symbolic outreach may become the impetus for cultural acceptance and change campus wide.

Recommendation 2: Create a separate emergency management department or elevate the emergency manager in the campus hierarchy.

The research was clear in identifying a lack of authority and resources for the campus based emergency management programs. Binghamton University should consider creating a separate and distinct 'Department of Emergency Management' headed by a Director level position. As a standalone department separate from University Police, emergency management

would have its own budget where fiscal priorities could be determined exclusively by the Director of Emergency Management. In addition to the fiscal advantages, an emergency manager who operates from a ‘Director’ position will have a greater level of authority when attempting to solicit participation from other campus departments. The emergency manager would be able to work with other department heads as a peer and would be perceived as an equal when seeking assistance and participation.

The creation of a Department of Emergency Management would expand on the support from senior staff as discussed in recommendation #1. Where an organization places a program in its hierarchy symbolizes how important that program is in its culture – a new standalone department would symbolize a substantial shift in Binghamton University’s organizational culture. A decision to create a new department would clarify emergency management’s place in the organization’s structure and would articulate change to the entire campus community in a highly visible manner. The department would be a concrete manifestation of a behavioral shift that embraces emergency management principles and one that places those principles in a position of greater authority and influence.

If a separate department is not immediately feasible, the emergency manager should be elevated in the institution’s hierarchy so he reports as close as possible to the executive leadership. Just as in the case of the creation of a new department, elevating the emergency manager in the reporting structure symbolizes the program’s increased level of importance to the institution. The emergency manager should report directly to a vice president or at a minimum to the Chief of Police. This change would clearly indicate to the campus community that a cultural shift has begun and structural and operational changes are outward symbols of the larger change in behavior. When combined with the support of the executive leadership as described in

recommendation #1, the structural changes combined with behavioral changes would provide the necessary initial steps towards the creation of a new culture that embraces mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. This high level of reporting will be a symbolic step in adopting emergency management principles and is one step closer to creating a culture that truly embraces emergency preparedness.

Recommendation 3: Expand communications within the University Police Department.

If the emergency management program is to remain within University Police, department leaders should consider expanding the existing methods of communication. As was shown in Tierney's model of cultural exhaustion, communication plays a critical role in the organization's ability to accept change and to adopt adequate and effective reform. The existing communication model used by University Police is ineffective and does not provide ample opportunity for officers to understand new structures and priorities. New communication efforts should be put into place so that the cultural roadblocks that are slowing progress can be overcome and a new culture, one that embraces emergency management principles, can be created. New communication methods should no longer solely rely upon written messages. The use of verbal communication within University Police should be greatly expanded. Department management should provide regularly scheduled meetings with all employees of the department where the leaders could introduce new programs and discuss existing projects. Face-to-face discussions will allow department employees to ask questions and develop a greater understanding of the purposes behind management's decisions. Not only will this help with law enforcement related matters, but the emergency management program would benefit from a greater understanding of its mission. If the department's rank and file has an opportunity to learn more about their own organization, there is a greater likelihood that the officers will understand

and thus support the emergency management program. With greater understanding and support of emergency management, behaviors will likely begin to evolve and a new, more productive emergency preparedness culture will begin to emerge.

Recommendation 4: Certify the emergency manager as a sworn police officer.

As was seen in each of the case studies, police agencies are not welcoming to anyone outside of the law enforcement community. If the emergency management program is to continue to operate from within University Police, the emergency management program would benefit from certifying the emergency manager as a sworn police officer. As a police officer, the emergency manager would be seen as ‘one of them’ and would not be perceived as a civilian employee. As described by Garcia, law enforcement culture is uniquely resistant to change and to influence from ‘outsiders’. Certification as a sworn police officer would allow the emergency manager to operate from within the culture and he would no longer have to fight deeply entrenched behaviors as he attempts to improve program performance. Change would not likely be immediate as the perceptions of existing officers would take time to accept the former ‘civilian’ emergency manager as one of their own. As existing employees begin to accept the new ‘police officer’ status of the emergency manager and as new employees with no organizational memory are hired, the emergency manager will eventually become welcomed into the organization’s culture. This acceptance into the police culture would allow the emergency manager to more easily gain the support of his co-workers and could increase program performance with the cooperation of the entire department.

Conclusion

Colleges and universities are developing emergency management programs to improve emergency preparedness and to reduce the likelihood that the organization will fail to meet its mission. Binghamton University is not unique to this growing trend and its emergency management program is searching for methods and opportunities to increase its level of performance. To improve its effectiveness and efficiency, Binghamton University must develop an understanding of the organizational culture from which it operates, and use the knowledge of that culture to grow and evolve so it is able to thrive. By using a comparative analysis of similar institutions Binghamton University is able to enhance its perspective of its own program by gaining insight into the inner workings of similar organizations. Data that surfaced as a result of the comparative case study has provided concrete recommendations which can be used to increase the overall performance of Binghamton University's emergency management program. A successful and productive emergency management program will provide Binghamton University with effective mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery projects. These projects will help the university remain focused on its core mission of education while embracing a culture of emergency preparedness.

Appendix A

Interview Instrument

1. Name, Organization, Title
2. Are you currently a sworn police officer? Peace officer?
3. Describe any emergency response experience you have.
4. How many people are assigned duties within your emergency management program?
5. What are the responsibilities of your emergency management program?
6. What are the goals of your emergency management program?
7. What are your expectations of your emergency management program?
8. What type of preparedness projects does your department pursue?
 - a. Mitigation?
 - b. Response?
 - c. Recovery?
9. Do you undertake efforts to increase program effectiveness and/or efficiency? If so, please describe.
10. Does your department experiment with new ways to perform tasks / projects? If so, please describe.
11. Does your department review how similar organizations deal with emergency management challenges? If so, please describe.
 - a. If so, do you adopt changes that have proven to be successful within those organizations? If so, can you provide examples?
12. Describe how your department may react to environmental forces (i.e. regulatory requirements, organizational expectations, etc.)
13. Is your emergency management program currently facing any challenges or problems that need to be solved? If so, please describe.
14. What do you perceive as your role in regards to emergency management projects?
15. FOR EMERGENCY MANAGERS: What do you perceive is the role of your supervisor in regards to emergency management projects?

16. FOR SUPERVISORS OF EMERGENCY MANAGERS: What do you perceive is the role of your department's emergency manager in regards to emergency management projects?
17. What are your expectations of the emergency management program?
18. Do any of the emergency management projects have deadlines and/or timeframes assigned to them?
 - a. How are the deadlines / timeframes determined?
 - b. How are the deadlines / timeframes enforced?
19. Has your emergency management program experienced a change in personnel?
 - a. If so, has this affected the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the program? How?
20. Does the emergency management program have benchmarks (i.e. measurement tools for determining the effectiveness of implemented change)?
 - a. If so, please describe.
 - b. If not, why? Do you see a value to program benchmarks?
21. Describe your employees / coworkers perception of the emergency management program?
22. How are changes to policy, procedures, and/or programs communicated within your department?
23. Describe the willingness / reluctance of your employees / coworkers to participate in, support, and embrace change.
24. What programs, other than emergency management, are managed from within the University Police Department?
 - a. What is the title, gender, training level of the person responsible for this program?
25. Is the culture within your police department supportive of the emergency management program? If so, how?
 - a. Supportive at the management/administrative level (i.e. through resource allotment, managerial support, etc.)
 - b. Supportive at the patrol officer level (i.e. willingness to participate and support programs, supportive of emergency manager, etc.)
26. If you could restructure, realign, or reallocate resources within your department in any way you chose, what would you do?

27. Where in the organization hierarchy do you believe the emergency management program should be assigned?
- a. Where should be emergency manager fit into this hierarchy?
 - b. Is there anything that prevents you from making these changes?

Appendix B

Date: March 29, 2010

To: David Hubeny, DPA

From: Anne M. Casella, CIP Administrator
Human Subjects Research Review Committee

Subject: Human Subjects Research Approval
Protocol Number: 1398-10
Protocol title: *Reforming Organizational Culture to Improve Emergency Preparedness, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery at Binghamton University*

Your project identified above was reviewed by the HSRRC and has received an expedited approval pursuant to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regulations, 45 CFR 46.110(7). The Informed Consent document has been approved with the following Waivers: 46.116 (4) Waiver alternate treatment, 46.116 (6) Waiver of requiring whether medical treatments are available if injury occurs

An expedited status requires that you will be required to submit a Continuing Review application annually as outlined by Federal Guidelines: *46.109 (e) An IRB shall conduct continuing review of research covered by this policy at intervals appropriate to the degree of risk, but not less than once per year, and shall have authority to observe or have a third party observe the consent process and the research.*

If your project undergoes any changes these changes must be reported to our office prior to implementation, using the form listed below:

http://humansubjects.binghamton.edu/2009_Forms/012_Modification%20Form.rtf

Any unanticipated problems and/or complaints related to your use of human subjects in this project must be reported, using the form listed below,

<http://humansubjects.binghamton.edu/Forms/Forms/Adverse%20Event%20Form.rtf>

and delivered to the Human Subjects Research Review Office within five days. This is required so that the HSRRC can institute or update protective measures for human subjects as may be necessary. In addition, under the University's Assurance with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Binghamton University must report certain events to the federal government. These reportable events include deaths, injuries, adverse reactions or unforeseen risks to human subjects. These reports must be made regardless of the source of funding or exempt status of your project.

University policy requires you to maintain as a part of your records, any documents pertaining to the use of human subjects in your research. This includes any information or materials conveyed to, and received from, the subjects, as well as any executed consent forms, data and analysis results. These records must be maintained for at least six years after project completion or termination. If this is a funded project, you should be aware that these records are subject to

inspection and review by authorized representative of the University, State and Federal governments.

Please notify this office when your project is complete by completing and forwarding to our office the following form:

<http://humansubjects.binghamton.edu/Forms/Forms/Protocol%20Closure%20Form.rtf>

Upon notification we will close the above referenced file. Any reactivation of the project will require a new application.

This documentation is being provided to you via email. A hard copy will not be mailed unless you request us to do so.

Thank you for your cooperation, I wish you success in your research, and please do not hesitate to contact our office if you have any questions or require further assistance.

cc: file

Pamela Mischen

Diane Bulizak, Secretary

Human Subjects Research Review Office

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